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Aktuelle Südostasienforschung / Current Research on South-East Asia
Prioritising the Variables Aﬀ ecting 
Human Security in South-East Asia
Alexander K. Lautensach1   &   Sabina W. Lautensach2   
University of Northern British Columbia, Canada           Human Security Institute, Canada 
 Citation  Lautensach, A. K., & Lautensach, S. W. (2010). Prioritising the Variables Affecting Human Security in South-
East Asia. ASEAS - Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 3(2), 194-210.
Human security is usually framed as a multidimensional concept that depends on socio-political, 
economic, health-related, and ecological ‘pillars’. An assessment of human security requires an 
analysis of the nested relationships between those variables. Focusing on South-East Asian coun-
tries we illustrate how those relationships can be used to prioritise determinants of human security. 
Such priorities are important because policies directed at promoting human security require defi nite 
starting points and targets. What emerges is a collage of nested systems in which global and region-
al environmental patterns exert the dominant infl uence. We assess the long-term human security 
prospects of South-East Asian countries by comparing their ecological footprints. South-East Asia’s 
major ecosystems have not yet been overly incapacitated by the impact of its human populations. 
Human security policies could be much improved by addressing the growing inequities in ecological 
footprints and by public education campaigns on the signifi cance of ecosystem health.
Keywords: Human Security, Environmental Security, Ecological Footprint, Sustainability, Overshoot 
Menschliche Sicherheit wird für gewöhnlich als multidimensionales Konzept charakterisiert, das auf 
sozio-politischen, ökonomischen, gesundheitsbezogenen und ökologischen „Säulen“ basiert. Eine 
Untersuchung menschlicher Sicherheit erfordert demnach die Berücksichtigung der Wechselwir-
kungen zwischen diesen Variablen. Anhand der südostasiatischen Länder illustrieren wir, wie die-
se Wechselwirkungen genutzt werden können, um die Determinanten menschlicher Sicherheit 
zu priorisieren. Derartige Prioritäten sind notwendig, da eine Politik zur Stärkung von menschli-
cher Sicherheit klar defi nierte Ausgangs- und Zielpunkte benötigt. Es entsteht eine Art Collage von 
ineinander greifenden Systemen, in denen globale und regionale ökologische Muster einen bestim-
menden Einfl uss ausüben. Wir untersuchen die langfristigen Perspektiven von menschlicher Sicher-
heit in den südostasiatischen Staaten durch einen Vergleich ihrer ökologischen Fußabdrücke. Südost-
asiens wichtigste Ökosysteme sind bisher relativ wenig durch menschliche Aktivitäten in Mitleiden-
schaft gezogen. Menschliche Sicherheit in Südostasien könnte also stark verbessert werden, wenn 
den zunehmenden Unterschieden der ökologischen Fußabdrücke entgegen gewirkt wird und öff entli-
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che Kampagnen zur Bewusstseinsbildung für die Bedeutung der Ökosysteme betrieben werden. 
Schlagworte: Menschliche Sicherheit, Umweltsicherheit, Ökologischer Fußabdruck, Nachhaltigkeit, 
Raubbau
Conceptualising Human Security
Human security as a concept first surfaced in the early 1990s when it became 
increasingly clear that the end of the Cold War would not be accompanied by an 
end to armed conflict but that instead the nature of violent conflict was changing, 
away from traditional interstate war towards intrastate conflicts fuelled by ethnic, 
religious, or ideological divisions. The discourse about security became enriched with 
the new insight that states are not the only entities whose security ought to concern 
us. Regions, communities, families, and individuals can only feel secure if they have 
reason to believe that their continued functioning is not going to be threatened at 
every turn. Furthermore, the security of the state largely depends on the security of 
regions, communities, families, and individuals. And occasionally states fail to fulfil 
their obligations as security guarantors, even to the point of threatening the security 
of their own citizens. It was realised that a primary requirement for human security 
was not merely the absence of war but the absence of structural and personal violence 
(Galtung, 1969). These realisations informed a shift in perspective from the state as 
the subject and object of security policy to the human individual as the centre of 
security considerations – from state security to human security (Griffin, 1995). And 
since human beings, unlike states, are capable of sensations and emotions, human 
security was recognised as partly contingent on those particular states of mind that 
we tend to associate with human well-being. 
It follows that human security depends on variables that extend beyond what has 
traditionally been regarded as the political arena. The absence of violent conflict is 
only one of many determinants of human security, including a relative safety from 
acute infectious disease, minimum complements of safe fresh water and adequate 
nutrition, and a formal guarantee of basic human rights and dignity. Concern for 
security also became extended further into the future. It became acceptable to 
Alexander K. Lautensach & Sabina W. Lautensach - Prioritising the Variables Affecting Human Security in South-East Asia
ASEAS 3(2)
196 197
express concern about the future well-being of one’s children, and, from middle age 
onward, with the well-being of their children, and so on. This long-term humanitarian 
concern has gradually come to inform the agenda of human security, as indicated 
by some common definitions of sustainability (WCED, 1987; UN Millennium Project, 
2005). 
With those concerns in mind, how, then, should we define human security? 
Development agencies operating under national, super-national, or non-governmental 
umbrellas have adopted these extensions of the security concept into environmental 
and ethical dimensions. This re-conceptualisation is evident in several key policy 
documents of the United Nations. In the Secretary General’s Millennium Report the 
UN’s security agenda is defined as ‘freedom from fear’ and its development agenda 
as ‘freedom from want’ (United Nations, 2000). Thus, the UN’s guiding principles 
on security are paraphrased in negative terms as freedom from a condition that is 
evidently undesirable. Similarly, Alkire (2002, p. 2) defined the objective of human 
security as ‘to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive 
threats, and to do so without impeding long-term human flourishing’. Elsewhere 
(Lautensach, 2006) we suggested that those definitions are unhelpful, an argument 
which we can only summarise here. First, negative definitions are always fraught 
with logical difficulties. Second, ‘freedom’, ‘fear’, and ‘want’ are highly subjective and 
emotive concepts: the extent to which individuals will experience those sensations 
depends on differential metabolic states, emotional states, situational and associative 
contexts, as well as cultural backgrounds. An absence of wants or needs can also 
be caused by an absence of self-confidence, a negative self-image, or a defeatist 
self-concept. It is also not possible to reduce those wants and needs to minimum 
requirements for survival.
Another objection to those popular definitions states that the focus on ‘freedoms’ 
blinds the observer to the problem of limits or of scale. In any given quasi-closed 
system (such as an island, a desert oasis, or a planet) the extent to which the human 
inhabitants’ needs and wants can be satisfied depends on the population size. Other 
variables, such as individual affluence and technological sophistication also apply, 
but only temporarily. For example, the same freedom from water shortage for a 
region in sub-Saharan Africa can be achieved without much effort for a population 
of a few thousand while remaining utterly unachievable if that population measures 
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in the millions. 
In order to arrive at a definition of human security that might realistically allow 
us to promote it in specific contexts, it is helpful to first examine what sources 
of insecurity might threaten the global citizen. Because of the subjective nature of 
human security, such an examination must involve consultation with the people in 
question. Multinational opinion surveys3 point towards criminal violence, armed 
conflicts (civil or international), terrorism, infectious disease, and ‘natural disasters’ 
as the events that people are most concerned about. The latter include extreme 
weather events, climatic aberrations, pest invasions, famines, floods, landslides, 
earthquakes and volcanism, and meteorite impacts. Other sources of insecurity 
include economic collapse, personal bankruptcy, personal accidents with traumatic 
health effects, and chronic health problems. Of course all of those factors potentially 
give rise to acute wants and needs in the individual. But by focusing on those sources 
of insecurity we eliminate some of the ambiguity and heterogeneity associated with 
the abovementioned ‘freedoms’ while gaining the advantage of focusing on more 
clearly defined targets. This would better facilitate proactive and preventive policy 
planning and enable us to enlist a host of descriptive-analytical sciences for our 
planning efforts. Returning to the example of water security, by focusing on possible 
causes of water shortage and on the systemic requirements for water security, the 
observer would be forced to take into account the limits of the local system, an 
essential requirement for the design of long-term effective and sustainable policies.
To summarise so far, the most useful definitions of human security tend to 
focus on sources of insecurity because they allow us to eliminate unreasonable, 
unjust, and counterproductive demands from our scope of targets – demands that 
are often formulated by security providers rather than by the victims of insecurity. 
While these definitions may not give us a more objective notion of what human 
security means, they enable us to more clearly identify the most deserving targets 
for countermeasures. Given the added strength of source analysis with regard 
to problems of scale we feel justified in advocating it as the superior conceptual 
3  For example, one survey conducted in the UK identified crime and ill health as the greatest concerns (cf. http://
www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewItem/itemID/8084). Of course such surveys are biased by the 
influence of media, the entertainment industry, and momentary scaremongering. But taking them into account 
decreases the extent of paternalism in security policies, where people are often told what their security needs are 
by a small number of individuals holding relatively secure positions in society. The same consideration applies at the 
international scale in the context of ‘development aid’.
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approach. Focusing squarely on the sources of insecurity obliges us to pay attention 
to areas that lie beyond the scope of peace research in Galtung’s (1969) sense, namely 
the absence of personal violence and the presence of social justice. The reason is that 
some of those sources are situated outside of the social realm and are shaped by the 
ecological interactions between our species and its biotic and abiotic environment, 
beyond ethics and justice. Thus, human security in its expanded meaning includes 
more than peace.
A survey of the sources of insecurity suggests that a comprehensive definition of 
human security needs to include four broad areas which we refer to as the ‘four pillars’ 
of human security (Lautensach, 2006). They include the traditional area of military/
strategic security of the state; economic security, particularly the contribution made 
by heterodox models of sustainable economies; health-related security, informed by 
epidemiology and the complex determinants of community health and health care 
priorities; and environmental security that models the complex interactions between 
human populations and their ecological support structures, the source and sink 
functions of their host ecosystems. Environmental security is defined as security 
from ‘critical adverse effects caused directly or indirectly by environmental change’ 
(Barnett, 2007, p. 5). Elsewhere (Lautensach, 2006) we elaborated on how each pillar 
can contribute to our understanding of the sources of human insecurity and enables 
us to mitigate their effects. We shall now show that environmental security plays a 
special role among them.
The Significance of Environmental Security
Since the inception of the Four Pillar model and other similarly multidisciplinary 
models (such as the United Nations Development Program’s [UNDP] seven dimensions 
[UNDP, 1994, pp. 24-33] which cover the same areas as the four pillars), it has become 
increasingly clear that the most intriguing and challenging questions in human security 
deal with the interrelationships between the four pillars. Numerous case studies 
suggest that sources of insecurity have roots in more than one area. Those different 
roots tend to affect each other, sometimes reciprocally in a positive feedback pattern. 
A well-known example is the causation of violent conflict that is often situated in 
social injustice, economic destitution, and environmental scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 
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1999). Any increase in one of those variables tends to stimulate the others, which 
leads to a general worsening of the situation unless drastic interventions lead to 
simultaneous improvements in more than one of them. Any sustainable solution to 
the crisis requires improvements in all three areas of causation. The current situation 
in Sudan exemplifies this problematic. 
The example also illustrates the significance of sustainability in addressing 
human security issues, a requirement that appears as self evident as the frequency 
with which it gets ignored by policymakers and theorists alike. Sustainability is 
defined by the balance between efforts to support the quality of life for a human 
population and the continued functioning of its environmental support structures, 
namely ecosystems.4 Ecosystems consist of local communities of species and their 
physical environment. They serve as sources of food, raw materials, and energy, and 
they recycle the population’s wastes. Complex ecosystems that are rich in species 
(occurring especially in the tropics) tend to be more resilient to disturbances, whereas 
ecosystems that consist only of a few species tend to be more fragile. 
Human populations, like all other animal populations, obtain their sustenance 
from ecosystems which provide food, raw materials, and energy, and which recycle 
organic wastes back into biomass. Human populations are special in that they employ 
technology to maximise the benefits of those ecosystem processes. But regardless 
of this technological windfall, the capacities of local ecosystems remain limited. 
Generally, the environmental impact I of a human population on local ecosystems 
is described by the I=PAT formula, where P means population size, A stands for the 
affluence or economic means per capita, and T represents the technological impact per 
capita (Ehrlich & Holdren, 1971; York, Rosa, & Dietz, 2003). The maximum sustainable 
impact, also referred to as carrying capacity (Curry, 2006, p. 126) is thus described 
as the product of the three variables: it can be reached by small populations with a 
high-impact lifestyle or by larger populations where each individual demands less 
in terms of support services. When a population exceeds the maximum sustainable 
4  We use the term only in its original environmental meaning and do not refer to other, secondary interpretations 
such as cultural or social sustainability. Lemons (1996, p. 198) defined sustainability as “the continued satisfaction 
of basic human physical needs, such as food, water, shelter, and of higher-level social and cultural needs, such as 
security, freedom, education, employment, and recreation”, along with the “continued productivity and functioning 
of ecosystems”. We regard the popular ‘Brundtland’ definition of sustainability (WCED, 1987) to be quite useless 
because of its lack of conciseness, inattention to meta-ethical considerations, and its neglect of fundamental 
ecological limitations. A more useful definition, attributed to Steve Goldfinger (Chambers, Simmons, & Wackernagel, 
2000, p. 2), states that a sustainable community is one that converts resources into waste no faster than ecological 
support structures can convert the waste back into resources.
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impact it enters into overshoot, whereby the services of the local ecosystem are 
being overtaxed and, depending on their fragility, may undergo irreversible structural 
changes (Catton, 1980; McMichael, 2001; Meadows, Randers, & Meadows, 2004; 
Wackernagel et al., 2002). Inevitably the consequence for the population is such 
that various biological regulatory mechanisms lead to a decrease in population size, 
below the system’s carrying capacity. Numerous precedents from animal populations 
have allowed ecologists to characterise and predict those dynamics with impressive 
accuracy.
The environmental impact can also be expressed in terms of the area of 
productive land required to support a population’s lifestyle. This is referred to as that 
population’s ecological footprint (Wackernagel & Rees, 1996). A population whose 
footprint exceeds the amount of accessible land is clearly in overshoot. This may 
not always have immediate negative consequences for their security as they may 
obtain the shortfall from other regions that are either underpopulated, defenceless, 
or otherwise disempowered. It is, however, often unjust and supports unsustainable 
patterns of consumption.
To summarise this sequence of causation, unsustainable practices sooner or 
later lead a population into overshoot, which in turn erodes environmental support 
structures and decreases their capacity to deliver resources and to accept wastes. 
This means that the environmental security of the population is threatened, which 
can manifest itself in shortages of food, energy, or other commodities, or in elevated 
levels of pollution. Such changes invariably compromise population health and lead 
to economic decline, civil disorder, and vulnerability to external enemies. Evidence 
is provided by the historical precedents of cultures that disappeared as a result of 
this sequence of effects (Diamond, 2005). The upshot is that whatever safeguards 
may be in place to protect the economic security of a population, its public health, 
its national security, and the rule of law – they seem of little help in the long term 
unless sustainability and environmental security are guaranteed. This resonates with 
Barnett’s (2007) finding of a mutual dependence between environmental security 
and peace, and it reaffirms Norman Myers’ (1993; Myers & Kent, 2004) original 
thesis that all security ultimately depends on environmental security. It also brings 
the ‘four pillar’ metaphor into question – more appropriate would be one in which 
environmental security forms the basis from which the three pillars of economic, 
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socio-political, and health security support human security as a whole. This does not 
imply that the ultimate causes for all security threats are necessarily environmental; 
it does mean that mitigation efforts directed at the pillars will be ineffective if the 
ultimate cause lies in the base, and that mitigation directed at the base may well end 
up solving certain problems in the pillars.
This revised model informs a different approach towards assessing the human 
security of countries and regions, at least in the long term. If human security in 
the long term depends first and foremost on environmental security, then it can be 
assessed by examining the extent to which sustainability is evident. The easiest way 
to verify whether a community or country is living sustainably is by examining the 
population’s ecological footprint, although other approaches are being developed by 
experts in the new field of pherology (Ponton, 2001), the science of human carrying 
capacity. We will now illustrate this approach on the example of South-East Asia.
Assessing Human Security Through Sustainability in South-East Asia
We have seen that the four determinants of human security interact and reinforce 
each other and that environmental security forms an essential baseline because 
sustainability represents a sine qua non condition for the other aspects of human 
security, at least in the long term. Focusing now on the region of South-East Asia 
we shall apply this conclusion in order to assess its prospects for long term human 
security. 
As explained above, the ecological footprint of a population or country is 
equivalent to the total bio-productive land area required to sustain its consumption 
of resources (food, energy, raw materials) and the processing of its wastes. It is 
calculated by complex algorithms that are still being refined to take into account 
further pherological details (Wackernagel et al., 1997). Table 1 shows the footprints 
of the twelve South-East Asian countries as well as their respective land areas. 
Normally, in order to assess whether a country is in overshoot, its footprint is 
compared with its available bio-productive land area in the manner of an economic 
comparison of demand and supply (Wackernagel et al., 1997; Ronsin, Newman & 
Dubois, 1999). However, in this case data on bio-productive land were either not 
available or based on unclear definitions. 
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Sources: NationMaster, World Wildlife Fund, CIA World Factbook, Living Planet Report, Global Footprint Network (GFN), Redefining Progress
Table 1: Demographic and Biogeographical Comparisons of South-East Asian Countries:  
Sustainable Countries, At Risk Countries and Comparison Countries
Population
[Thousands]
(Year)
50,020 (2009)
14,805 (2009)
6,320 (2009)
6,732 (2009)
240,272 (2009)
28,318 (2009)
91,983 (2009)
4,998 (2009)
67,764 (2009)
88,069 (2009)
599,281 (2009)
495,000 (2010)
33,931 (2010)
309,186 (2010)
6,818,500 
(May 2010)
Area 
[ha]
67,657,800
18,103,500
23,680,000
46,284,000
190,456,700
32,984,700
29,976,400
73,232
51,312,000
33,121,000
493,649,332
420,000,000
998,467,000
982,663,000
14,894,000,000(10)
Individual 
Footprint
[ha/Person]
(2009 data)
1.07
0.83
0.91
1.40
1.48
3.68
1.42
4.2
2.70
0.95
1.60 (0.83 – 4.2)
4.99 – 9.88
Av. 5.1 (2005)
7.66
12.22
2.1 (2005)
Collective 
Footprint 
[ha](5) = Clai-
med 
Footprint
53,521,400
12,288,150
5,751,200
9,424,800
355,602,560
104,210,240
130,615,860
20,991,600
182,962,800
83,665,550
959,034,160
2,524,500,000
259,911,460
3,778,252,920
14,318,850,000
Sustainability 
Quotient(6) 
0.79
0.68
0.24
0.20
1.87
3.16
4.36
286
3.57
2.53
1.94
6.01
0.26
3.84
0.96
Annual GNI 
per Capita 
[USD](7)
< 975 (est.)
640
760
1,040
1,880
7,250
1,890
34,760
3,670
890
2,644(9)  
38,839
43,640
47,930
8,654
Country
Burma / Myanmar
Cambodia
Laos
Papua New Guinea
Indonesia
Malaysia
Phillippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
South-East Asia(8)  
EU (27)
Canada
USA
World
Sustainable Countries
At Risk Countries
Comparison Countries
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We therefore resorted to a simple comparison of national footprint to national 
territory, giving a sustainability quotient (SQ). We consider this simplification 
acceptable for two reasons. First, South-East Asia does not include extensive regions 
of non-productive land such as deserts or alpine mountains, making it likely that a 
country’s area of bio-productive land approaches its total territory minus urban areas 
which are not extensive, relative to other regions. Second, this simplified comparison 
produces an optimistic estimate of sustainability, in the form of the SQ as the ratio 
between the two areas. An optimistic estimate might preclude some of the criticism 
that such comparisons invariably attract. We will address some possible objections 
below.
The ratio between collective footprint and available productive land area, i.e. the 
sustainability quotient, provides a measure of the effort required of each country 
to reach the goal of sustainability. The most extreme situation is obviously that 
of Singapore, with a footprint 286 times its territory (which is largely not bio-
productive). However, as a city-state it carries a separate status, one of obligatory 
ecological dependence on surrounding lands, a circumstance which evidently has 
not impeded its growth so far. For Singapore, sustainability can only ever be reached 
with significant help from its neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia. This example also 
illustrates the limits of an analysis based solely on national statistics; many aspects 
of environmental security are more clearly described by data across bio-geographical 
regions. The significance of national SQ values is that they directly relate to national 
polities.
The other eleven countries form a continuum ranging from clearly sustainable 
(Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Papua New Guinea [PNG]) to clearly unsustainable situations 
(with the Philippines and Thailand being the worst off), as listed in Table 1. Not 
unexpectedly the SQ values seem to correlate inversely with per capita GDP, which 
suggests an interesting relationship, namely that poverty might somehow facilitate 
5  The collective ecological footprint is calculated as the footprint per person multiplied by the population size.
6  The sustainability quotient (SQ) is calculated as the collective national footprint divided by the area.
7  Annual gross national income per person was reported in the OECD Atlas, October 2009.
8  South-East Asian totals and means were calculated without Timor-Leste and Brunei.
9  This figure is reported for East Asia and the Pacific. For South Asia it is only USD 963.
10  The number represents the total planetary land area. A more appropriate number for footprint analysis is 13.4 
billion ha of biologically productive land and water area (GFN, 2005), although that, too, probably represents an 
overestimate. Most of the more detailed analyses suggest that the critical SQ of 1.0 was already exceeded during the 
mid-1980s and has steadily increased ever since (MAB, 2005).
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sustainability. We do not mean to imply causality but a correlation seems to be evident. 
However, several clarifications are in order. Average per capita statistics are quite an 
unreliable measure of poverty as they say nothing about the differences between 
urban and rural communities, nor do they say much about the poorest section of the 
population – and even if they did, such a number would only measure spending power 
which often does not reflect at all how those people perceive their own ‘poverty’ in 
terms of the quality of their lives. Also, Table 1 shows high values of GDP correlating 
with low degrees of sustainability. We hold this to be a direct result of the growth 
ideology, the belief that greater affluence represents a worthwhile goal in itself and 
must be pursued by all possible means through ‘economic growth’. Following that 
ideology, most development agencies regard low-GDP countries as natural targets for 
remedial action. Sadly, most development aid programs and associated agencies have 
taken this ideology on board quite uncritically, resulting in ‘development’ towards 
increased consumption and away from the goal of sustainability (Myers & Kent, 2004). 
We also derive some encouragement from those numbers insofar as they show 
the potential of South-East Asia to get it right in time. The comparison of the regional 
mean with the data for North America and the EU shows the extent to which those 
‘developed’ countries are still entrenched in their colonialist tradition of extracting 
their livelihood from other parts of the world. Clearly they are very far from being able 
to satisfy their demands from the resources of their own territories. Thus they are the 
main contributors to humanity’s global overshoot, estimated at about 40 percent (SQ = 
1.4) (Wackernagel et al., 2002); by the late 1990s humanity appropriated 40 percent of the 
biosphere’s net primary photosynthetic productivity (Vitousek, Mooney, Lubchenko, & 
Melillo, 1997). South-East Asia, on the other hand, although sharing some culpability, 
does not face the same daunting obstacles on its path towards sustainability. We 
wish to emphasise that nature inevitably makes populations reach sustainability one 
way or another: their co-operation merely renders the transition less painful. Thus, 
the major good news emanating from this analysis it that South-East Asia’s transition, 
although traumatic in terms of reversing economic trends that have by now assumed 
the status of a crypto-religion, is unlikely to bring as much hardship as other regions 
will face.
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In our analysis of numerical data we have not commented on several possible 
objections to the pherological approach, which we wish to rectify in closing. One 
frequent objection rests on the claim that human populations are incommensurable 
with other animal populations because of their use of technology. We know of no 
evidence suggesting that the advent of agriculture and other technology has changed 
the principle of our basic dependency on ecosystems; however, it did result in 
maximum sustainable impacts being more closely approached or even increased, 
and it served to obscure the fact of our dependency. Agriculture has led to profound 
modifications of supplier ecosystems, which increased their yield and decreased 
their complexity (Rees, 2004). Adaptive technology has allowed for a much wider range 
of habitats to be colonised by humans at a global scale, and it has helped us establish 
trade links to transport resources and wastes between distant locations. What it has 
not done and cannot do is to change our status as a consumer species, as opposed 
to producers and decomposers. Certainly the exceptionalist ideals of the pervasive 
anthropocentric ethics do not make it so.
Another objection states that the consumption patterns of a modern community or 
country, its global trade and migrations, are too complex to be expressed merely as a 
land area. Most developed countries, especially urban centres, are deeply dependent 
on daily infusions of food, fuel, fresh water, and other supplies and services from its 
trade partners. This is illustrated in Table 1 by the extreme SQ value for Singapore, 
and it reflects an extreme economic and ecological dependence that resulted from 
profound ecological modifications. What portions of local ecosystems in such ‘highly 
developed’ places that have not been paved over have long been changed into intensive 
agricultural production systems, which many endemic species could not accept as 
their habitat, resulting in their extinction. While it is true that all local populations 
and ecosystems are connected with neighbouring regions and with the biosphere 
through complex biogeochemical cycles and migrations, the human situation represents 
merely a quantitative extension, not a qualitatively different situation. Furthermore, 
footprint analysis is equipped to take such exchanges of goods and services into 
account. 
Lastly, we wish to engage with the argument that this kind of analysis merely points 
to an area of inadequacy without offering much help towards mitigating the situation. 
A detailed analysis of the components that contribute to a country’s footprint, based 
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on data that are not shown in this paper but that were instrumental in the footprint 
calculations published by others, itemises and quantifies the areas of consumption. 
It readily allows for specific measures directed at reducing specific demands. It does 
not, however, address the problem of unrealistic costing as evident, for example, in 
the ubiquitous practice of not including environmental costs in transport and fuel 
use. Should those fuels ever become scarce as the ‘peak oil’ scenario suggests, or should 
their use become restricted as part of mitigation measures to address climate change, 
the impact of the resulting reality check can be mitigated through timely and directed 
restrictions to the most expendable areas of consumption. Also, at the international 
scale, comparisons of national footprints can identify the transition needs for rich 
and poor countries and guide appropriate transition initiatives promoting distributive 
justice. Voltaire’s dictum that “the rich require an abundant supply of the poor” 
certainly holds true at the global scale as well; in this situation, however, the poor will 
be able to advise the rich on how to cut their consumption with minimal trauma.
Our moderately optimistic conclusion that South-East Asian countries are relatively 
secure from threats emanating from unsustainable practices also requires a few 
qualifications. First, our comparison of national footprints against national territory 
inevitably leads to an underestimate of risk. This is clearly seen in the SQ of Canada, 
where the bio-productive area is obviously far smaller than the total area. Secondly, 
although footprint analysis addresses an important aspect of human security – we 
believe that it is the most important one in the long term – it does not reveal sources 
of human insecurity relating to the other three ‘pillars’ of the model, nor can it 
identify environmental problems that are not dependent on the population’s impact, 
such as climate change. The recent unrest in Bangkok and the underlying problems 
with corruption and autocracy shows that some threats to human security are only 
very tenuously and indirectly linked to environmental security. Moreover, national 
footprints are based on average levels of consumption: in countries with extreme 
stratification such as the US and many developing countries, such numbers only touch 
the surface of the underlying internal problems of inequity. A national average also 
does not reflect territorial inequity, as in the case of continental and insular Malaysia. 
In the long term, however, the findings provide valuable insights for the designers 
of development policies. In some countries, especially Laos, Burma, Cambodia, and 
PNG, neither population growth nor current economic ‘growth’ poses a threat to long 
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term human security as of yet; excessive economic dependency is not in evidence 
which makes the transitions to sustainability easier. In other countries, such as the 
Philippines and Thailand, the two trends need to be tackled together with great 
urgency, but differentially in urban and rural areas. 
We believe that educational reform offers huge potential in mobilising the 
coming generations to take an active part in the required transition to sustainability 
(Lautensach & Lautensach, 2010). The United Nations recognised this to some extent in 
2002 by naming 2005-2015 the ‘UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development’. 
Every child and teenager needs to understand what ecological footprints can tell them 
about their future, and how important ecosystem health and a stable population are 
for the future security of their families and communities. 
Besides education, direct intervention and re-direction of economic policies will 
be necessary in the countries with the highest SQ values in order to ease them into 
sustainable modes of zero growth (Daly & Cobb, 1994; Myers & Kent, 2004). This 
would include the Philippines, Thailand, mainland Malaysia, and Vietnam. However, 
taking into account data on economic stratification would allow policymakers to 
determine those communities where a large footprint is caused only by the excessive 
consumption of elite minorities, which should be politically easier to tackle; economic 
growth would merely need to be slowed, not reversed. The overarching political 
emphasis of those interventions should be on the protection, strengthening, and 
expansion of ecological support systems on the one hand, and the stabilisation of 
population growth and consumption on the other. With their environmental security 
thus secured, the citizens of South-East Asian countries will have the opportunity to 
ensure that economic security, public health, and socio-political stability will ensue.
Overall, the comparison of South-East Asian SQ values with North America and 
Europe indicates that the region has a little more time to deal with those problems, 
compared to other parts of the world where the number of options seems much 
diminished. Considering the massive ideological obstacles on the path to sustainability11 
11  As we elaborated on elsewhere (Lautensach & Lautensach, 2010), those obstacles consist mainly of beliefs, 
attitudes, ideals, and values that are dominated by the ideology of progress. They rely on our propensity to create 
myths and to rely on those myths for conceptual explanations and for normative justification and evaluation 
(Rees, 2004). Specifically, those myths include the intrinsic value of economic growth and the belief in its indefinite 
continuation (also referred to as cornucopianism) (Ehrlich & Holdren, 1971), an ill-informed optimistic outlook on 
historical developments, scientism, moral nihilism and materialism, consumerism, and the ideal of dominion over 
nature informed by Cartesian dualism and anthropocentrism (Lautensach & Lautensach, 2010). It is the guiding 
influence of myths that Chet Bowers (Bowers, 1993, p. 99) referred to when he asserted that “humans are essentially 
cultural beings (in thought, communication and behaviour), and it is as cultural beings that they interact with the 
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a little extra time to influence the course of events may make all the difference.
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